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also discusses Taylor on the deception issue, misinterpreting 
him by implying that this is his sole reason for rejecting sport 
hunting. According to Causey, Taylor would have to hold 
that the bow hunter who cleanly kills an animal after a 
necessarily deceptive stalk, afterwards making "full, 
nonfrivolous" use of the body, behaves more morally 
objectionably than the safari "hunter" who runs down the 
terrified prey in a Land Rover, shoots it with a semi-automatic 
weapon, and leaves the body to rot (except for the head). 
(Causey, op. cit., p. 340.) Taylor is committed to no such 
implication. His "duty of fidelity" (nondeception) to nature 
is only one of the duties he believes moral agents have to the 
wild. The overriding duty we have to wild creatures, he holds, 
is respectful treatment. Taylor objects to sport hunting on the 
grounds that it shows a lack ofrespect to that which we ought 
to respect ([aylor, pp. 274-276), not just on the grounds that 
it is deceptive. Obviously, the Land Rover hunter who uses 
heads for interior decoration shows less respect for wild 
creatures than Causey's highly idealized bow hunter. (Actual 
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all deer hit by arrows are retrieved by bow hunters. The rate 
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in great pain. See "The American Hunter Under Fire," U. S. 
News and World Report, op. cit., p. 35, "Bow Hunting: A 
Most Primitive Sport," The Animals' Ageruia, May 1990, pp. 
15-18, and "Bowhunting Under Attack," Act'ionLine, Aprill 
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"The Joy of Killing" was written during spring, 
1990, when I was freed from teaching dUlies by 
my appointment as the 1990 Pennsylvania State 
University "Helena Rubinstein Endowed Fellow 
in the Humanities." 
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Integral to the defenses of hunting offered by 
Causey and Vitali is the claim that human beings are 
instinctive killers. Pluhar rightly disputes this claim 
on two grounds. 
(1) It is by no means clear that human beings have a 
basic urge to hunt and kill or that killing animals 
is an essential human trait, in that a number of 
human beings, indeed a majority, lack the urge. 
And as she correctly points out, the paleolithic 
humans who doubtless took pleasure in cooking 
and eating animals they had hunted may well 
have done so because they were hungry; there is 
no compelling reason to assume that their 
pleasure came from the act of killing itself. 
Further, ex-hunters generally do not claim that 
they have learned to control a tremendous urge 
to hunt, whereas previously they were victims 
of akrasia, but rather that they have had a gut-
level transformation such that they no longer 
even have the urge to hunt. 
(2) It is by no means clear that even if there were a 
basic human atavistic urge that it would 
automatically be permissible to hunt animals; 
likewise, the basic sexual urge in human beings, 
assuming for the moment that such an urge is 
basic, does not give a carte blanche to the rapist 
or child molester. 
The purpose of my response to Pluhar's paper is to 
reinforce these two criticisms of Causey and Vitali, a 
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procedure which will force me to leave aside much in 
these two articles which deserves criticism, as in 
Causey's canard that animal rightists usually defend 
their case by an appeal to emotion rather than to reason 
(as if Regan, Singer, Clark, Sapontzis, Jamieson, et al., 
never existed), or as in Vitali's assumption that by 
showing (if, in fact, he can show this) that only human 
beings are rational he can avoid the argument "from 
marginal cases" without also showing that all human 
beings are rational. My attempt to reinforce Pluhar's 
criticisms will rely explicitly on certain sociobiological 
considerations which, it seems, are implicit in Pluhar's 
paper. That is, I intend my remarks to be friendly 
amendments to Pluhar's paper. My hope is that this 
brief, hence inadequate, foray into sociobiology will 
both combat the standard right-wing appropriation of 
sociobiology (an appropriation which is often used to 
defend hunting) and avoid the standard left-wing fear 
that by taking sociobiology seriously we are admitting 
the nonmalleability of human nature and society. 
First, do human beings have a basic urge to kill? It is 
worth noting that gorillas and chimpanzees are, for the 
most part, plant-eaters, although chimpanzees will also 
eat small animals. Causey's and Vitali's fantasies about 
"The Human Hunter" should be corrected not only by 
the evidence from our primate ancestors but also by the 
reminder that even modem human hunter-gatherers get 
almost all of their food from plants (although eggs and 
small animals may also be gathered) and certainly eat 
nothing like the amount of flesh consumed in the West. 
We know very little about what our hominid ancestors 
ate, but the best guess is that as good a case can be made 
for their being grain-eaters as that they were predators. It 
is convenient, to say the least, for Causey and Vitali to 
see a brutal vitality just below the skin of (male) human 
beings, but there is no evidence provided in their articles 
to move the anti-hunter away from his view of human 
beings as calmer, more companionable, and less 
committed to a grossly predatory way of life than that 
which the hunter defends. l 
Ethological evidence regarding violence among 
conspecifics can help to point out Causey's and Vitali's 
hyperbole. A fight between two wolves can end abruptly 
if the loser submits; the victor will snarl above the exposed 
neck of the other, but he will not bite, since his desire to 
seize the other is "inhibited." This is the type ofexample 
which readily suggests itself as an analogue for moral 
conscience. By way ofcontrast, doves react to defeat by 
fleeing; if the loser cannot flee, the victor is not inhibited 
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from pecking him to death. In Causey's and Vitali's 
positions human beings inhabit the worst of two worlds: 
they are, like the doves, not inhibited from killing (in the 
human case, from killing members ofother species), and 
their capabilities to kill have been vastly increased through 
weaponry. Although it is not impossible for a human 
being to kill a conspecific with his bare hands ( and this 
not because we have sharp teeth or claws, but because 
human beings have bodies thatare somewhat vulnerable), 
it is very difficult to do so; murder most likely began 
with the invention ofclubs. And it is even more difficult 
to kill game animals with one's bare hands than it is to 
kill our conspecifics.2 
More fruitful than the effort to trace hunting back 
to the seething, paleolithic "beast" within us is the 
effort to understand it as part of a culture which has a 
fetish for guns, a fetish the continued existence of 
which is assured by frankly reactionary organizations 
like the NRA. Hence there is something disingenuous 
in Causey's and Vitali's indignation at the close 
association some see in the terms "hunter" and 
"redneck." Animals are generally more inhibited about 
killing conspecifics than about killing outside their 
species, but even when this fact is considered it only 
becomes likely that nonhuman animals will be hunted 
by human beings if human beings stipulate a right to 
own guns in order to do so. 
lt is is incumbent on the anti-hunter who denies a 
basic urge to kill to explain the continued appeal of 
hunting, albeit to a minority of the population. I am 
proposing two reasons: first, in America, at least, there 
is a strong historical and cultural fascination with 
weapons, a fascination which is a historical and 
cultural contingency rather than a biological necessity; 
and second, there is a noticeable ease with which 
human beings can objectify those who are not familiar. 
People generally, I suggest, do not wish to hunt or kill 
their fellows. Look around the room. But our nonnal 
humanity can be turned off if we are convinced we 
are dealing with heretics or savages or gooks or, in 
the present case, with nonrational beasts. This is where 
Causey's and Vitali's avoidance of, or refusal to deal 
with, the argument from marginal cases is a bit too 
convenient. When this argument is considered 
carefully it becomes much harder not to notice our 
familiarity with our fellow animals. I have said that 
people "generally" do not want to hunt or kill their 
fellows, which leaves open the possibility that there 
are some sociopathological cases which do, in fact, 
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fit Causey's and Vitali's description, just as the 
Harlows' motherless, raped monkeys treated their 
infants as they would have treated rats. The sadness is 
that otherwise moral people like Causey and Vitali (by 
the way, I have known and liked Vitali for 15 years) 
have unwittingly delivered an apologia for these 
monstrous mammals reared without love.3 
Ethological suggestions that "aggression" has an 
instinctual root have been given a bad press by 
interpreters like Causey and Vitali. Ethologists have 
been interpreted as saying (and some of them may think 
that they are saying) that war or murder or hunting are 
unavoidable and that it would be unnatural (and perhaps 
dangerous) to outlaw hunting. But in ethological jargon 
"aggression" refers to any display or threat or carefully 
inhibited contest. The aggressive impulse is very often 
no more than the impulse to "make a good show before 
one's fellows" or to "try one's weight." These contests 
do not, for the most part, employ the animal's most 
dangerous skills. The point of these displays-from 
the musical displays of birds to the squabbles among 
tom cats to match the preferences of females-is not 
so much to maim, much less to kill, one's rival as to 
establish the details of one's own life within a social 
context. A predator hunting to survive is another matter, 
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but neither Causey nor Vitali are trying to defend 
subsistence hunting. 
Thus far I have attempted to support Pluhar's 
position that Causey and Vitali do not have sufficient 
evidence to claim that human beings have a natural 
desire to kill. I would also like to support her claim 
that the mere existence of the desire to kill would not 
in itself establish the case for the morality of hunting. 
All morality involves some ascetical principle, not in 
the pejorative sense of self-denial, but in the original 
sense of askesis as the (athletic) training of desire. In 
virtue-based ethics the exercise of the desire to kill, if 
such a desire existed, would have to compete with 
other desires in the attainment of eudaemonia; in 
utilitari-anism it would have to be demonstrated that 
the exercise of such a desire was conducive to the 
maximization ofpleasure and the minimization ofpain 
for sentient beings in general in that some desires must 
give way to others in order to do justice to the 
utilitarian calculus; and in deontology one may act on 
a desire only if one does not infringe on the rights of 
others. Causey says nothing very convincing here, 
apparently because she thinks that the mere existence 
of the desire to kill is self-authenticating. Vitali, as 
Pluhar notes, does try morally to justify hunting, but 
his section on the denial ofanimal "rights," the weakest 
section in his article, does not show sufficient familiarity 
with the details of the arguments ofanimal-rightists who 
are philosophers. 
Causey, at least, if not Vitali, seems to be led to the 
assumption that the existence of an urge to kill in 
humans guarantees the morality of hunting because of 
the supposed pragmatic necessity of the urge: without 
it human beings would not have survived. But the 
matter is a bit more complicated than this. Even if one 
accepts the position of the sociobiologists that human 
morality is at least somewhat connected with those 
biological predispositions which are conducive to 
survival, it is not necessarily the case that the defenders 
of hunting have a lock on this position. Moral concern 
for other species can be traced back to natural 
sentiments, as in the fact that people who cared for their 
domesticated animals tended to leave more descendants 
than those who used them carelessly,4 just as among 
nonhuman animals the dominant members of the species 
were most often those who allowed their subordinates 
lives of their own, and who sometimes even assisted 
them, because to press home one's attack often causes 
"the courage of despair" in one's victim which causes 
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the dominant member to pay a greater price than he 
would want to payor could pay.s 
I would like to conclude by making it clear that in 
this response I have not tried to defend in general the 
use of sociobiological principles to solve philosophical 
problems, a task which would require a great deal more 
effort than I have expended. Rather, I have tried to 
show that ifit is legitimate to introduce sociobiological 
considerations into philosophical disputes, in this case 
into the dispute regarding the morality of hunting,6 then 
we should not assume that such considerations 
necessarily support the hunter's case. That is, anti-
hunters should resist the claim that justice and mercy 
are free-floating cultural artifacts which are not rooted 
in natural inclination. 
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6 It should be noted that Causey explicitly relies on the 
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